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There is a well-known conflict between managers and shareholders, superbly illustrated by 
the agency theory. A way for shareholders to ensure that managers will perform optimally, 
by taking the best actions and decisions, is to tie managers' compensation to the performance 
of the firms. However, how can we fairly measure their performance? The Economic Value 
Added (EV A) methodology seems to be a good solution; recent events reinforced the idea 
that accounting indicators analysis may not be a suitable approach. 
The EVA is not a widespread concept in Portugal and its inception is relatively recent. To 
have an idea about how Portuguese managers perceive EV A and to understand which 
strategies (e.g. wages policy, bonuses, stocks and/or stocks options) firms utilize to make 
everybody happy, particularly managers, we developed a study with Portuguese public 
entities, using the questionnaire methodology. 
